

## AGRICULTURE OF UZBEKISTAN DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

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### Abstract

The article talks about the workers of the agricultural sector of Uzbekistan, who, overcoming and selflessly working on all the hardships of a difficult wartime, stubbornly forged a victory over the enemy. About the feat of labor of the villagers, which led to the transformation of the republic into a reliable arsenal of the front and was an integral part of the global struggle in the fight against fascism.

**Keywords:** Dekhkhans, agriculture, food products, monoculture of cotton, war, personnel, material and technical base, polybots, labor discipline, canals, labor feat.

### Introduction

An honorable place in the nationwide struggle to defeat the enemy was taken by the Uzbek dekhkhans. With the outbreak of the war against fascism, the republic's agriculture faced the responsible task of providing the front with food supplies and industry with raw materials. For this, it was necessary in the shortest possible time to transfer agricultural production, like the entire national economy, to a war footing, to mobilize its material resources.

The general program of restructuring the agrarian sector of the republic in a warlike manner was set forth in the decree adopted by the union government on August 18, 1941 "On the military-economic plan for the IV quarter of 1941. and in 1942. in the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. " In accordance with it, the V plenum of the Central Committee of the CP (b) Uz, held in December 1941. defined the following tasks: to expand the sowing area by 521.800 hectares, including 34700 hectares on irrigated land, to continue at an accelerated pace to increase the production of raw cotton; to triple the gross grain yield, bringing it to 15 million centners, to ensure the cultivation of a new culture for the republic at

that time - sugar beet on 70,000 hectares, to increase the productivity of animal husbandry, sericulture and other agricultural sectors [1].

As it is seen today, the party and government decisions providing for a sharp increase in the area under grain and industrial crops were a vivid expression of the voluntarist diktat of the center. They obliged to increase the sown area of Uzbekistan, which annually sent hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers and its material and technical means to the front, exposing fields and farms. Under these conditions, demanding from the republic a sharp expansion of the cultivated areas initially doomed this action to non-fulfillment. And nevertheless, throughout the entire course of the war, the allied line was unconditionally carried out. Every year plans were received from Moscow indicating the areas of new lands that the villagers were supposed to put into circulation. And at this time, the main sown areas fell into decay and were out of order, since there was no one to cultivate them.

The long-term dominance of cotton monoculture has significantly complicated the solution of tasks to increase food production. Indeed, as a result of the strict implementation of the center's course for the advanced development of cotton production, the entire structure of agriculture in the republic was aimed at the beginning of the war mainly at growing cotton. The production of grain crops was of secondary importance. Grain was imported mainly from the RSFSR and Ukraine. The occupation of the grain-producing regions by the enemy made the agrarian industry of Uzbekistan need to self-sufficiency in the republic with its own grain. Meanwhile, there was a lack of the necessary equipment, specialists, the experience of ancestors was largely lost. In addition, having set before the leadership of Uzbekistan the task of "food self-sufficiency", the Stalinist administration did not want to reduce cotton crops. Cotton growing continued to be considered as the leading direction of agriculture in the region. Moreover, its production should have increased. Indeed, during the war, cotton became a very important raw material for the defense industry.

Secondly, with the outbreak of the war, the material and technical base of agricultural production weakened significantly. As a result of objective realities, the vehicles of the MTS, collective farms and state farms were gradually reduced. The supply of tractors and other equipment to the village has practically ceased. The supply of agricultural enterprises with spare parts, fertilizers and fuel has sharply decreased. As a result, the share of manual labor

has increased enormously, and the volume of work on live draft has increased. They plowed mainly on cows. They also used primitive tools, like the grandfather's omach.

Thirdly, the personnel issue has become noticeably aggravated. The war diverted most of the qualified personnel and able-bodied rural population to the front and the defense industry. Many rural workers went into the military industry and construction, joining the ranks of the working class. As a result, already in 1941-1942. the number of able-bodied collective farmers decreased in Uzbekistan by 20%, and by 1945 - by almost 40% [2]. The machine operator corps was shrinking especially noticeably. So, if by the beginning of the war the total number of machine operators and combine operators was 27888, then in 1942 there were only 2775 of them, and even less in 1943 [3].

Obvious excesses were allowed along the lines of "strengthening labor discipline." Nowadays it has become well known that the Soviet leadership at all turning points in history has invariably sought to solve urgent problems, primarily at the expense of the peasantry. This course continued during the war period. In wartime, state procurement of agricultural products consistently grew. Moreover, this happened against the background of a significant reduction in its yield and gross harvest.

Contributions to the state grew at the expense of consumption funds, which were decreasing from year to year. State procurement prices for collective farm products remained basically the same as before the war: 7-8 kopecks. for 1 kg of grain, 3 - for 1 kg of potatoes, 41-53 rubles. for the head of cattle. The prices on the market have increased by 100-200 and more times. As a result, procurement prices began to play a symbolic role and did not cover production costs. This negatively affected the income of agricultural enterprises. For example, the gross income from 1 hectare of cotton, which is the basic crop of agriculture in Uzbekistan, was 2040 rubles in 1941, 1050 rubles in 1942, and 760 rubles in 1943. In other words, virtually all collective and state farm products came to the state's disposal free of charge. The sharp decline in consumption funds had a heavy impact on the financial situation of the villagers. In the village, in fact, famine reigned [4].

In the current situation, a fall in agricultural production was inevitably to be expected. After all, the hungry workers of the village often did not have the strength for exhausting, physically extremely difficult agricultural work. Then,



in order to intensify the labor activity of the peasants, the SNK and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) issued on April 13, 1942, a special decree "On increasing the mandatory minimum of workdays for collective farmers." According to him, each member of the collective farm from now on had to work not 60-100 workdays, as it was established before the war, but not less than 100-150. For the first time, a mandatory minimum of 50 workdays was introduced for adolescents who were issued work books. Collective farmers who had not worked out the established minimum were considered to have left the collective farm with all the ensuing consequences. Meanwhile, for non-fulfillment of planned tasks, dekhkans were deprived of their personal plot, declared "labor deserters" and were brought to administrative and criminal responsibility. Able-bodied collective farmers could be prosecuted and punished with corrective labor on the collective farms for up to 6 months for not working days for periods of work.

As a result of the implementation of this resolution, only in 1943 about 8% of families were excluded from the collective farms of the republic. More than two thousand collective farmers ended up in Stalin's camps [6]. The policy of the "administrative club" merged with the policy of strict ideological control. This action was submitted under the sign of increasing party influence on the entire course of political and economic work in the countryside. One of its links was the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), adopted in November 1941, to re-establish the political departments at MTS and state farms that had been dissolved in 1934.

In the Soviet historical literature, as a rule, it was emphasized that the political departments provided daily assistance to agricultural enterprises in the implementation of production plans, carried out a great deal of political and educational work. At the same time, it was kept silent that the leadership of the political departments was directly connected with the bodies of the Beria NKVD. It is no coincidence that they were not accountable to rural district committees.

The leaders of the political departments saw their main task in spurring "labor discipline", in the selection of personnel loyal to the party, in the unconditional provision of state deliveries by the village workers. Work was actively developed to organize political departments at the turn of 1941-1942. In order to speed it up, the Central Committee of the CP (b) Uz specially sent 567



organizers to the MTS, including 189 communists as heads of political departments, 189 deputies and 189 assistants in the Komsomol unit [7].

First of all, the political departments of the MTS directed their efforts towards the intensive expansion of the network of rural party organizations of collective farms and state farms, called upon to practically implement the policy and directives of the party in the countryside. As a result, in 1942 alone, 362 Party organizations were re-created on the collective farms of the republic. The number of communists in agricultural cartels has doubled in comparison with 1942 [8]. The number of Komsomol organizations also increased. On October 1, 1942. in Uzbekistan there were 6426 collective farm Komsomol youth organizations, which united 108177 boys and girls, in MTS and MTM - 171 (1977 people). Their number increased by 373 over the year.

The political departments of the MTS took the organization and accounting of labor in the agrarian sphere into their own hands. Workers of the political departments systematically checked the reports on the collective farms and the records of workdays in the books of collective farmers, initiated criminal cases against, as it seemed to them, insufficiently active members of agricultural cartels. But even, being ruthlessly squeezed into an administrative-totalitarian grip, the villagers did not lose the best human qualities that had been nurtured for centuries. They did not identify the Soviet system with the Motherland. Their main thoughts were associated with the victory over foreign invaders. They saw a sacred duty in helping the front.

With the beginning of the war, the Uzbek dekhkans actively entered the mortal struggle with the cruel enemy. At the rallies held in July 1941, the inhabitants of the villages and auls of the republic solemnly swore: "We will give the country as much cotton, wool, meat, grain, milk as is necessary to defeat the insidious invaders" [9].

And the words of the collective farmers did not differ from their practical deeds. For example, the agricultural cartel named after Stalin of the Khalach village council of the Vabkent district of the Bukhara region, the collective farms "Bolshevik", "Leninism" and them. Voroshilov, Gzhduvan region, named after Lenin and them. Krupskaya of the Sverdlovsk region and hundreds of others in the very first days of the war fulfilled their obligations ahead of schedule for the supply of meat, butter, wool and feta cheese. For 7 days, the collective farms of

the Bukhara region fulfilled the annual plan of meat deliveries by more than 60%, and the collective farms of the Vabkent region - by 22% [10].

A stubborn struggle unfolded in the republic for every kilogram of cotton, meat and grain. A particularly vigorous effort was made to harvest cotton. In particular, in the Shurchinsky district of the Syrdarya region, the 1941 cotton crop was harvested 24 days earlier than in 1940 [11]. The workers of the Bukhara region exceeded the plan of cotton harvesting in 1941 by 114.2%, having handed over to the state 201.3 thousand tons of raw cotton. Dehkans of the Tashkent region fulfilled state assignments by 110.4%. having handed over 194119 tons of raw cotton [12]. On the whole, in the republic, the plan for cotton harvesting in 1941 was fulfilled 45 days earlier than in 1940. The state received 1,646 thousand tons of "white gold" [13].

High rates were achieved in other branches of agricultural production. The harvest campaign was successfully held in the grain regions of the Tashkent, Bukhara and Surkhandarya regions. In 1941, the republic's livestock breeders supplied the state with meat - 108.3%, milk - 153.4, eggs - 165.5, wool - 105.5, astrakhan fur - 117.7, fur - 125.5, furs - 116, 3% of the planned targets [14]. After completing agricultural work in 1941, the farmers immediately joined the struggle to create the necessary prerequisites for a new harvest. Late 1941 - early 1942 characterized by the widespread intensification of work on the restructuring of the agricultural sector for military needs. First of all, priority was given to finding additional land areas for expanding crops of grain and industrial crops and the most efficient use of the land fund.

The plan adopted by the governing bodies of Uzbekistan for 1942 provided for an increase in sown areas on irrigated lands by 118.2 thousand hectares [15]. There has never been such a large increase in irrigated areas in one year. This was to be achieved at the expense of land developed as a result of new irrigation construction (over 100 thousand hectares) and plowing of unnecessary lines, corners, unnecessary roads (16 thousand hectares). In addition, for the first time, it was envisaged to re-sow grain and vegetable crops on an area of 33 thousand hectares. The possibilities of sowing between rows of orchards, vineyards and mulberry on an area of 15 thousand hectares were also taken into account [16].

But priority was given to irrigation construction. Moreover, it had to be carried out with minimal expenditure of budgetary funds.

As the research materials show, during the war years, the area of irrigated land in Uzbekistan expanded mainly through the construction of small irrigation facilities, the active use of flood waters. At the same time, large canals were erected. Among them are Dyushambinka-Karatag, Northern Tashkent, Sokh-Shakhimardan, Kassansai-Chust, Verkhne-Uchkurgan, etc. In the winter of 1941-1942. the Kattakurgan reservoir, called by the people the "Uzbek Sea", began to fill with water. In September 1942, the construction of the Great Gissar Canal was completed, which irrigated 40 thousand hectares of land. 50 thousand collective farmers of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan worked on the route [17].

In 1942, more than 25 million m<sup>3</sup> of earthworks were carried out at the irrigation facilities of the republic. In 45 days, the "Vatan Uchun" canal was built by the popular construction method. Thus, by the spring of 1942, an additional 220.5 thousand hectares of new fertile lands were developed. On the whole, owing to the selfless labor of the dekhkans, the sown area on the irrigated lands of Uzbekistan in comparison with the pre-war period increased by 26% in 1941, and by 49% in 1942 [18].

The ratio of agricultural crops has changed markedly. If before the war in each district cotton accounted for up to 90% of the sown area, then during the war years it significantly decreased. For example, in the Fergana region, the area under cotton was reduced to 51%. The rest of the irrigated land was occupied by other crops, including 25% grain, 4% vegetables and melons, 16% alfalfa [19].

This measure was undoubtedly positive. The limitation of the cotton monopoly contributed to the germination of food resources and the rise of livestock raising. Thus, the sharp expansion of the sowing of forage crops made it possible in a short time to noticeably increase the number of livestock farms and the growth of their production. Already at the end of 1942, out of 7454 collective farms in Uzbekistan, 2,400 were able to maintain 3 and 4,800 - 2 farms. Only 49 collective farms did not have livestock farms [20].

An important link in the restructuring of agriculture was the training of personnel designed to replace those who went to the front, to industry and to construction sites. This task was solved by promoting experienced practitioners to the leading sectors of agricultural production, expanding the training and retraining of personnel in agricultural universities, technical



schools and courses. Personnel of mass qualifications were trained mainly in short-term courses with and without interruption from production. Only for 1942-1943. at such courses were trained about 6 thousand chairmen of collective farms, over 2 thousand field breeders, almost 21 thousand brigade leaders, 34 thousand team leaders, 4 thousand livestock breeders [21]. During the war years, more than 200 thousand collective farmers and workers of state farms were trained in various courses. More than 685 thousand graduated from district and other collective and state farm schools [22].

The huge decrease in labor resources caused by the war, which occurred simultaneously with a decrease in the level of mechanization, required a colossal exertion of all the forces of the rural population. The production involved women, the elderly, and adolescents, who, as in industry, largely compensated for the loss of the male labor force.

I must say that women on the collective farm have always been a great force. But now almost all the worries of the agricultural cartels have fallen on their fragile shoulders. The slogan "Women for the tractor!" Became especially popular. Under the MTS and state farms of the republic, specialized courses for tractor drivers, combine operators and drivers were created, in which women acquired new professions. As of August 20, 1941, 82.4% of the 13776 students enrolled in two-month courses at the MTS and at the agricultural mechanization schools at the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the Uzbek SSR were women [23].

Having become experts in their field, women independently repaired the tractors assigned to them and far exceeded production targets. Thus, the names of women machine operators Saadatkhon Abdurakhmanova, Pulatkhon Umarova, Tursuna Aripova, and others became widely known in the republic. The growth of female machine operators contributed to the creation of female tractor brigades. During the spring sowing period of 1942, there were already 75 such brigades in the republic. In general, 3800 women were involved in machine-operator work [24].

The administrative apparatus of the agricultural sector was intensively replenished by women. In particular, already in 1944 3458 women worked as deputy chairmen of collective farms, 11950 as team leaders, and 48772 as team leaders [25].

Women worked fruitfully in all areas of agricultural production. Suffice it to note that the number of work-days worked out by women increased in 1942 in comparison with 1940 by 32%.

Adolescents made a significant contribution to the growth of agricultural production. The number of workdays worked out by them increased in 1944 in comparison with 1939 by 2.5 times [26].

A characteristic feature of wartime was the active involvement of additional labor in agricultural work. This action became especially intensive after the adoption of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the resolution "On the procedure for mobilizing the able-bodied population of cities and rural areas for agricultural work in collective farms, state farms and MTS" [27].

Mobilization was carried out mainly during the most intense periods of agricultural work, primarily during the maintenance of crops and harvesting. In 1942 alone, about 500 thousand people of the urban population were involved in agricultural work in the republic's collective farms.

In the collective farms of only zone 3 of the Syrdarya MTS, 2,700 old men and adolescents, 11,000 schoolchildren were involved in harvesting grain crops. In the Fergana region, 40,200 schoolchildren were engaged in the selection of ears. In Namangan region, 32,045 schoolchildren harvested 30,768 hectares of ear crops [28]. In total, in the fall of 1942, 300 thousand students from the republic's schools were attracted.

But the main burden still lay on the workers of the village. The awareness of the danger hanging over their homeland doubled their strength, for they knew that every pood of cotton, bread and other agricultural products they grew hit the enemy and brought victory closer. This feeling gave rise to various forms of labor and patriotic activity.

The Uzbek farmers took an active part in the creation of the defense fund. One of the first members of the "Leninism" collective farm of the Yangiyul district of the Tashkent region contributed to this fund an amount equal to the cost of 340 workdays and decided to deduct one workday each month. Collective farm them. The Comintern of the Kalininsky district of the Tashkent region allocated 7 thousand rubles to the defense fund. money and 3.5 thousand bonds, 1 ton of shala and 5 tons of wheat [29]. Workers of the Kumkurgan state farm donated 24 rams and bonds worth 16,500 rubles to the defense fund [30]. In general,

only in the first few months of the war, 300 tons of grain, 219 tons of meat, 2 tons of wool, 18,500 sheepskins and several tens of a million rubles were received from the workers of the Uzbek village into the defense fund. In 188 cars, the collective farmers sent 1 million warm clothes to the front-line soldiers, a lot of food and other gifts [31].

The movement for the creation of the army's food fund took on a wide scale in the republic. In its most massive form, it manifested itself in the desire of farmers to maximize the production of crop and livestock products. Indicative in this respect are the data on the number of workdays worked out. So, despite all the difficulties of wartime, a noticeable decrease in the labor force, the labor output of the villagers increased from year to year. So, if in 1940 the average output per person able to work was 217 workdays, then in 1941 - 233 and in 1942 - 263 [32].

Another indicator is the organization of "socialist competition". True, it is no longer a secret that the so-called "socialist competition" was an instrument of the ideological influence of the totalitarian regime on the consciousness of the workers of the city and the countryside. It had to compensate for the lack of objective material incentives for labor. Socialist competition was largely far-fetched, formal in nature. Nevertheless, if we discard the ideological husk, then we can admit that during the war years in the "competition" reflected a massive patriotic upsurge. It has accumulated in peculiar forms the creative energy of the masses, their desire to forge victory in the rear with selfless labor.

In many farms of Uzbekistan, the movement for overfulfillment of production targets began to grow. Already in September, 667 collective farms of the Tashkent region joined it, 683 - Fergana, 961 - Samarkand and other agricultural cartels of the republic [33].

A specific expression of the labor activity of rural youth was the organization of front-line youth brigades. Their members worked with tripled energy, often for days, without rest, working in the fields and farms. So, in the collective farm "Ilyich" of the Khatyrchinsky district of the Samarkand region, a youth brigade of 15 people under the leadership of K. Khushvanov performed 2-3 norms for harvesting grain. Young collective farmers of the Ak-Altyn agricultural cartel in the same district of P. Razimuradov, Ismailov, Kadyrov harvested 0.77 - 0.80 hectares daily instead of the 0.30 norm. On the collective farm "Zarafshan" of

the Yakkabag district of the Bukhara region, a team of 27 people cultivated cotton crops during the day and harvesting grain at night [34].

By 1944, there were already 1357 front-line brigades in the republic, uniting 28442 boys and girls [35].

The desire of the villagers to "work at the front" was also expressed in the organization of the movement of tractor drivers - thousands, which originated in the spring of 1942 at the initiative of the mechanics of the 1st Karadarya MTS of the Samarkand region. Tractor drivers - thousands fought for the production of at least 1 thousand hectares by each "Universal" during the cultivation of cotton and sugar beets, carrying out transverse cultivation of cotton crops on an area of at least 2 thousand hectares instead of 1500 at the rate, for fuel economy [36].

The patriotic enthusiasm of rural workers was clearly manifested in solving the difficult task of a sharp expansion of grain crops and an increase in their yield. Thanks to the labor feat of the villagers, the sowing of grain crops increased from 1223.4 thousand hectares in 1940 to 1787.3 thousand hectares in 1943, and the yield of ear crops increased from 4.3 c / ha to 6.2 c / ha [ 37].

The expansion of crops was mainly due to cotton agricultural farms, which in peacetime almost did not have their grain crops. So, the collective farms of the Fergana, Namangan, Andijan regions in 1941 sowed grain crops only about 100 thousand hectares, and in 1943 they developed 315.4 thousand hectares for grain crops [38]. In 1943, the collective farms of Uzbekistan handed over to the state almost 8.5 million poods of grain more than in 1940. In addition, the villagers "sold" to the state about 2 million poods of grain from their personal reserves [39]. In general, during the war, collective farmers, workers of machine and tractor stations and state farms of the republic, overcoming enormous difficulties, handed over 82 million poods of grain, 213 thousand centners of shala [4].

Farmers of the republic paid close attention to the intensive development of sugar beet production. The most fertile and water-supplied lands in Samarkand, Fergana, Tashkent and Kashkadarya regions were allocated for its crops. In 1943, 65.1 thousand hectares of the sown area were already occupied by sugar beets. In April 1942, four large sugar factories were built in Uzbekistan in a short time: Zirabulak, Krasnogvardeisky, Kokand and Yangiyulsky.

In the development of a new culture, the republic was greatly assisted by agricultural specialists from Ukraine and Belarus. Thus, the well-known Ukrainian beet grower N. Zaglada worked on the Kuibyshev collective farm of the Khojaabad district of the Fergana region, and the notable beet grower K. Osichenskaya worked at the Bulungur MTS of the Samarkand region [41].

Mastering the experience of beet growers in Ukraine and other beet-growing regions, as well as introducing a lot of new things into the agricultural technology of sugar beet growing, the farmers of Uzbekistan achieved record harvests of this important raw material in a short time. For example, the beet growers of the collective farm. Pushkin, Samarkand district, collected 1200 c / ha, collective farms of Pastdargom and Jizzakh districts of Samarkand region received 400 - 800 c / ha, thereby several times overlapping the planned targets. [42]

In 1943, rural workers handed over to the state 1565 thousand centners of beets. The republic began to produce a quarter of all sugar production in the country, which was a great merit of the Uzbek farmers, who made a significant contribution to providing the army and the rear with valuable food crops.

Rural workers of Uzbekistan have successfully mastered another food crop - sunflower, began to grow such industrial crops as flax, kenaf, corn, sesame. In particular, in 1943 sesame crops in the republic accounted for 50% of the crops in the USSR [43].

Tobacco growing was further developed. In 1943, in comparison with 1941, the sown area under tobacco and makhorka in state farms of the region increased by 3 thousand 500 hectares, or by 60%, and in 1945 the area under tobacco increased by more than 60%, under makhorka. - by 200% [44].

Tobacco cultivation was concentrated in the Komsomolsk and Urgut districts of the Samarkand and Kasansay, as well as the Yangikurgan districts of the Namangan regions.

Sericulture acquired strategically important military importance during the war years. Before that, it was represented mainly by the individual sector. With the deployment of hostilities, the allied government, in order to establish widespread state control, decided to completely socialize this industry. Before each farm, firm planning targets were set [45].

The plan for sericulture in 1941 was fulfilled by 102.4%. It turned out that 283643 boxes of grenas were sold, 12055 tons of cocoons were handed over to

the state. The average yield from one box of grenade rose from 34.2 to 42.5 kg [46].

Subsequently, the silkworm breeders of Uzbekistan achieved even greater success. Thus, in 1942, 12189 tons of cocoons were harvested [47].

In February 1943, members of the S. Kalinin Ljaglyakinsky village council of the Rometan region appealed to all silkworm breeders with an appeal to increase the production of silkworm breeding. "The sacred duty of each of us," the address said, "is to work in such a way as to provide the Army with everything necessary, to provide the military industry with more and more strategic raw materials, among which silk occupies one of the most important places." [48]

This appeal found wide support among the republic's silkworm breeders. They fought with renewed vigor to further lift the industry. As a result, if in 1940 the share of Uzbekistan in the all-Union silk procurement was 47.8%, then by 1945 it had already reached 59.3%. [49]

During the war, the role of our republic also increased as one of the country's largest producers of fruits, grapes, vegetables, and melons. Thus, the area under vegetable crops in 1942 compared with 1939 increased from 16 thousand 571 hectares to 29 thousand hectares [50]. 25 thousand hectares is 15 thousand hectares more than the pre-war period was occupied by potatoes. In 1943, the collective farms of Uzbekistan handed over to the state 17,551 g of potatoes and 9,073 tons of substitutes. The plan for drying vegetables was fulfilled by 107%. The vineyards expanded from year to year. In 1943 they occupied 31 thousand 723 hectares against 26 thousand 661 hectares in 1940, in 1944, 1 thousand 600 hectares of new vineyards were laid. [51]

However, speaking about the achievements of those years, it is important to emphasize that it would be wrong to perceive the state of the rural economy of the republic as a continuous chain of successes. The difficulties of wartime, the internal flaws of the Soviet system of land use, undoubtedly affected. In the agrarian sphere, ambiguous processes have emerged. Along with the obvious achievements, there were also noticeable losses. So, during the war years, gardening suffered severe damage. On collective farms in 1940, gardens were laid on 3367 hectares, and in 1943 their area was reduced to 757 hectares. Due to an acute shortage of workers and preventive means, old and new plantations did not receive the necessary agrotechnical treatment. The fit was poor. Since 1944, active measures have been taken to restore horticulture. The gardens

were laid out on 1433 hectares. Nevertheless, in 1945 in the republic there were 3 times less fresh fruit than in 1940 [52]. Often, the fulfillment of the planned assignments proceeded along the line of requisitions from the personal subsidiary plots of the villagers, which noticeably affected their food situation. The wartime contradictions in cotton growing were especially vividly manifested.

Despite the change in the structure of agriculture in Uzbekistan, during the war years, cotton continued to be a priority agricultural crop in the republic. The country's leadership insistently demanded a tangible increase in cotton production.

Yours has already been said that from the first days of the war the cotton growers of the region fought with renewed vigor for every kilogram of cotton. In 1941 a rich harvest was collected. And subsequently, the workers of collective farms and state farms worked in a military manner in the cotton fields. Nevertheless, the volume of cotton production was declining. So, in 1942, 862,939 tons were collected instead of the planned 1,193,177 tons. The plan was fulfilled by 68.33%. [53]

The most difficult for the republic's cotton growing was 1943. Due to the change in the structure of the sown areas, the increase in the share of food crops, the area of cotton fields decreased compared to 1940 from 62.5 to 45%, or in absolute terms from 927650 to 625343 hectares. But even more alarming was the decline in yields. On average for 1942 - 1943. it decreased on collective farms from 17.4 to 7.1, and on state farms - from 27.1 to 8.8 centners per hectare. As a result, only 495 thousand tons were collected in 1943. raw, which accounted for only 57.7% of the plan. [54]

Along with the above reasons, the development of the industry was negatively affected by the lack of workers, mineral fertilizers, and a significant decrease in the level of mechanization. A deep negative impact was exerted by the costs of the administrative command system of leadership, the lack of due care of the Stalinist administration for the workers of the village. Considering the colossal difficulties that the Uzbek farmers had to overcome in the first years of the war, we can say that the results that were provided in 1942-1943 were achieved thanks to the enormous physical and spiritual efforts of the villagers, at the cost of great sacrifices and hardships of the entire Uzbek people. ... However, the center did not want to reckon with objective realities. As Nuriddin Mukhitdinov

recalls, at the beginning of 1944 the leadership of Uzbekistan was hastily summoned to Moscow for a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). AS Shcherbakov, presiding over the meeting, rudely cutting off the report of Usman Yusupov, said: "Comrade Yusupov, at such a difficult time for the country, do you want to leave the army and people without pants ?!" [55]

The highest union power elite did not want to understand the obvious things that the republic's resources are not unlimited, that the Uzbek people, by reducing cotton crops, were able not only to self-sufficiency in food, but also to increase supplies to the front day by day. In March 1944, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a special decree, in which it was strictly required to raise cotton growing to the pre-war level already in 1944, and subsequently to significantly increase cotton supplies. [56] In accordance with this decree, an extensive plan of measures was developed in the republic aimed at the restoration of cotton growing. Workers of the village prepared intensively for the spring sowing campaign in 1944. Cotton growers tried not to miss a single day, using all the opportunities to carry out deep plowing and early sowing of cotton, achieved full-fledged shoots, observed the quality of land cultivation and the timing of irrigation. Particular attention was paid to high-quality soil cultivation. It received twice as much local fertilizers as in previous years. This provided a full-fledged ripening of cotton on a large area. A lot of work has been done on the timely and lossless harvest.

The mobilization of labor efforts of cotton growers was also facilitated by the procedure for paying bonuses established in 1944, according to which each worker who harvested 3 thousand kg of cotton received a bonus of 200 rubles. , 6 thousand - 250 rubles. , 10 thousand - 300, for 15 thousand kg - 500 rubles. When collecting 10 thousand kg, manufactured goods were issued for 500 rubles. , 15 thousand kg - for 1 thousand rubles. at the rate of those years [57]. By the end of December 1944, Uzbekistan fulfilled the plan of cotton harvesting by 101.4%, 820 thousand tons were delivered to the state khirman. raw - by 325 thousand tons more than in 1943, the yield increased by 1.5 times [58]. This was a great labor victory for the collective farmers and workers of the MTS.

In 1945, the workers of the Uzbek village gave the country 824 thousand tons of "white gold". Thus, despite the difficulties, cotton growers made a decisive contribution to meeting the basic needs of the front and rear in cotton.

One of the branches of agriculture, which during the war years had an extremely important defense and national economic importance, was animal husbandry. The war radically changed the number and distribution of livestock. The temporary occupation of the western regions led to an increase in the share of the eastern regions of the country, including Uzbekistan, in the all-Union livestock balance. During the war years, the supply of leather and fur products to the Army acquired particular importance.

Since the beginning of the war, the republic's animal husbandry has experienced great difficulties. By the end of 1941, the number of livestock in the republic had decreased by 332 thousand heads. Its number in personal use decreased by 872.9 thousand heads, or by 27.1%. [59]

Subsequently, this trend continued. If on January 1, 1941, collective and state farms had 8403.1 thousand heads, then on January 1, 1943 - 8094.4, and on January 1, 1944 - 7798.9 thousand. In some areas, the situation was even worse. In the Fergana region, the total number of sheep and goats decreased in 1943 against 1941. by 18.5%, cattle - by 10.8%, pigs - by 65.8%.

A noticeable reduction was also observed in the individual sector. As of January 1, 1941, there were 3249.7 thousand heads of livestock of all types in personal use. In 1944, only 1385.8 thousand heads remained, or 46.2%. [60]

At the same time, it is important to note that, in general, more attention has been paid to animal husbandry. The restructuring of the policy of sowing agricultural crops made it possible to expand the fodder base of domestic livestock breeding, to accelerate the growth rate of young animals. For example, the workers of the Tashkent region during 1941-1942. increased the number of all types of livestock by 34.7% [61].

But the growth of the livestock did not keep up with the planned deliveries. Most of the livestock was sent to the needs of the Army and the rear. So, in the second half of 1941 alone, collective and state farms transferred 59 thousand horses to the Army in the field. [62] The death rate of livestock was high. In addition, despite a slight increase in the production of forage crops, the problem of forage, especially concentrated ones, remained serious. Therefore, with the beginning of the war, livestock breeders began to actively seek


reserves for strengthening forage resources. Concentrated feeds, which almost disappeared in the livestock ration, were replaced by coarse and succulent ones, not only forage crops were ensiled, but also wild grasses, young tree branches, and plant waste was used. [63]

Providing livestock in the winter with premises, fodder, creating insurance stocks was not an easy task, but the safety of the livestock depended on its decision. The shortage of harvested fodder was largely compensated by the timely organization of pasture farming. The introduction of distant pasture cattle breeding, when millions of head of cattle wintered in the steppes, gave a great economy of fodder. Reduced labor costs for servicing livestock, which was important in the face of a shortage of labor. In addition, overwintering in the open air, cattle were less exposed to diseases. As a result of the effective use of available pastures not only in summer, but also in winter, in 1942 the total livestock population was increased by 23 thousand [64].

In June 1943, the Central Committee of the CP (b) Uz, the Council of People's Commissars of the UzSSR adopted a resolution on changes in cattle breeding. It was proposed to replace the local outbred cattle of collective farms and state farms with highly productive pedigree Swiss and Ostfriesians. The species composition of livestock was updated in accordance with the change in the material base of animal husbandry. The reconstructed animal husbandry was to be built on the basis of the organization of pedigree farms with the establishment of special near-farm crop rotations to meet the needs of livestock in fodder. Capital construction of the missing livestock buildings was planned, providing them with a labor force.

One can fully agree with the assessment of R.Kh. Aminova that "this resolution, like many others, testified to the isolation of decision-making bodies from real life" [65].

Indeed, it was naive in the most difficult year of 1943 to raise the question of creating near-farm sites, replacing livestock with improved breeds, and even carrying out capital construction in the complete absence of building materials, labor resources, and financial resources. After all, it was clear that all this was extremely necessary for the front, but for the rear there was nothing left. Naturally, such a resolution could not be implemented. It remained mostly on paper. This was the characteristic style of management of the administrative-command system.



Positive changes in animal husbandry, as well as in other agricultural sectors, were achieved mainly by the selfless, heroic labor of Uzbek farmers. Thanks to their efforts, by the beginning of 1944 it was possible to significantly increase the proportion of collective and state farms in the republic in livestock production. In particular, from January 1, 1941 to January 1, 1944, it increased for sheep (excluding Karakul) from 56.7 to 79.7%, for goats - from 28.8 to 69.0, for pigs - from 51.5 to 86.3, for horses - from 94.7 to 99.4, for other types of livestock - from 32.6 to 54.8%. In total, in the republic in 1943, the growth rates of livestock significantly increased. If in 1942 the number of all types of livestock increased by 307.9 thousand heads, or 6.1%, then in 1943 - by 539.9 thousand heads (10.4%). [66]

However, although the population of the public herd increased, its quality indicators deteriorated. The proportion of breeding stock of all types of livestock, especially Karakul, decreased, which hindered the possibilities of expanded reproduction.

The 1943 state procurement plan was fulfilled mainly due to the over-planned purchase of livestock from the rural population. 100 thousand heads of cattle, 364.2 thousand goats and sheep, 1.7 thousand pigs were purchased. This significantly exceeded the purchases of livestock from the villagers in the pre-war years. Moreover, they were often made forcibly, for a pittance, at the expense of the impoverishment of dekhkans, which was a consequence of the totalitarian nature of the government. This policy led to an accelerated increase in the number of livestock-free farms. So, if in 1941 15.6% of all farms in collective farm yards did not have livestock, then in 1944 the number of such yards doubled and amounted to 34.8. Livestockless farming deprived the rural family of milk and meat, and had a depressing effect on the living standards of the villagers. Unfortunately, it was not possible to avoid a large loss of livestock due to epizootics, which amounted to 509.9 thousand heads against 410.3 thousand heads in 1942 [67] Therefore, the main task in the field of animal husbandry in 1944 was the struggle for the maximum preservation of the adult livestock and young animals, limiting the slaughter and sale of livestock at the expense of planned targets. At the same time, the task was set to increase the livestock population in the villagers' personal subsidiary plots.

In 1944, the Central Committee of the CP (b) Uz took a number of organizational measures to stimulate animal husbandry in the republic. To check the readiness

of collective and state farms for wintering, special teams of authorized representatives were sent to the farms [68].

This fact testifies to the importance attached to administrative pressure as the main method of party leadership. Indeed, how could the armchair workers of the wintering of cattle help? What could such a test give? It was necessary to apply economic incentives in place of administrative-pressure methods of work. The use of economic incentives could have a significant economic effect. But the party organs considered it necessary to apply precisely the administrative-pressure methods: reprimands, harassment and other punishments.


At the same time, a stake was placed on exploiting the labor enthusiasm of the masses. But people worked from dawn to dawn and without the party - ideological pumping. It is thanks to their heroic efforts, despite the obvious difficulties, that meat supplies and other livestock products to the front and rear have invariably increased. Thus, the collective farms of the Samarkand region in 1944 donated 13,500 tons of meat to the Army fund, and in 1945 - 22,400 tons, or 68% more [69].

In general, in Uzbekistan at the final stage of the war - 1944 -1945. the quality indicators of animal husbandry have improved. In 1945, the state plan for small ruminants was fulfilled by 101%, for large cattle - by 100%, and for the number of horses - by 102%. [70]

The labor feat of the rural population of Uzbekistan was an important prerequisite for the coming victory. During the war years, the collective and state farms of the republic handed over to the state 4 million 148,000 tons of raw cotton, 82 million poods of grain, 54,067 tons of silk cocoons, 195,000 tons of shala, 57,444 tons of fruits and grapes, 36,000 tons of dried fruits, 159,300 tons meat, 22300 tons of wool and many other products [71].

This was a worthy contribution of the agricultural workers of Uzbekistan to the nationwide struggle to strengthen the military-economic might of the Motherland, to defeat the enemy.

So, during the war years, the economy of Uzbekistan became an important component of the military-economic potential of the country. Working selflessly throughout the difficult wartime, agricultural workers, overcoming enormous hardships and hardships, stubbornly forged victory over the enemy. Their labor feat determined the transformation of the republic not only into a



reliable arsenal of the front, but also became an integral part of the worldwide struggle against the dark forces of fascism. At the same time, as at the front, the formation of the military economy was carried out by totalitarian methods, accompanied by deep perversions and unnecessary sacrifices. But the people selflessly worked not in the name of Stalin's "barracks socialism." At the front and in the rear, the foundations were laid for the elimination of Nazi totalitarianism. The solution to this problem did not coincide in time. However, the war allowed the people to realistically assess their leading role, showed its historical strength and significance. The sprouts of social consciousness, which originated in the harsh wartime, will sprout in a few decades into a powerful stream of the popular movement for national independence.

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